Logik für Informatiker Logic for computer scientists

Till Mossakowski


WiSe 2013/14

First-order structures

First-order structures: motivation

- How to make the notion of logical consequence more formal?
- For propositional logic: truth tables \Rightarrow tautological consequence
- For first-order logic, we need also to interpret quantifiers and identity
- The notion of first-order structure models Tarski's world situations and real-world situations using set theory





æ

э

First-order structures: definition


A first-order structure $\mathfrak M$ consists of:

- a nonempty set $D^{\mathfrak{M}}$, the domain of discourse;
- for each *n*-ary predicate *P* of the language,
 a set M(*P*) of *n*-tuples (x₁,...,x_n) of elements of D^M,
 called the extension of *P*.
 The extension of the identity symbol = must be

$$\{\langle x,x\rangle \mid x\in D^{\mathfrak{M}}\};$$

for any name (individual constant) c of the language, an element M(c) of D^M.





æ

э

An interpretation according to Tarski's World

Assume the language consists of the predicates Cube, Dodec and Larger and the names a, b and c.

- $D^{\mathfrak{M}} = \{Cube1, Cube2, Dodec1\};$
- $\mathfrak{M}(Cube) = \{Cube1, Cube2\};$
- $\mathfrak{M}(Dodec) = \{Dodec1\};$
- $\mathfrak{M}(Larger) = \{(Cube1, Cube2), (Cube1, Dodec1)\};$
- $\mathfrak{M}(=) = \{(Cube1, Cube1), (Cube2, Cube2), (Dodec1, Dodec1)\};$
- $\mathfrak{M}(a) = Cube1$; $\mathfrak{M}(b) = Cube2$; $\mathfrak{M}(c) = Dodec1$.

An interpretation not conformant with Tarski's World

- $D^{\mathfrak{M}} = \{Cube1, Cube2, Dodec1\};$
- $\mathfrak{M}(Cube) = \{Dodec1, Cube2\};\$
- $\mathfrak{M}(Dodec) = \emptyset;$
- $\mathfrak{M}(Larger) = \{(Cube1, Cube1), (Dodec1, Cube2)\};$
- M(=) =
 {(Cube1, Cube1), (Cube2, Cube2), (Dodec1, Dodec1)};
- $\mathfrak{M}(a) = Cube1$; $\mathfrak{M}(b) = Cube2$; $\mathfrak{M}(c) = Dodec1$.

Variable assignments

A variable assignment in \mathfrak{M} is a (possibly partial) function g defined on a set of variables and taking values in $D^{\mathfrak{M}}$. Given a well-formed formula P, we say that the variable assignment g is appropriate for P if all the free variables of P are in the domain of g, that is, if g assigns objects to each free variable of P. $D^{\mathfrak{M}} = \{Cube1, Cube2, Dodec1\}$

 g_1 assignes *Cube*1, *Cube*2, *Dodec*1 to the variables x, y, z, respectively.

 g_1 is appropriate for $Between(x, y, z) \land \exists u(Large(u))$, but not for Larger(x, v).

 g_2 is the empty assignment.

 g_2 is only appropriate for well-formed formulas without free variables (that is, for sentences).

Variants of variable assignments

- If g is a variable assignment, g[v/b] is the variable assignment
 - whose domain is that of g plus the variable v, and
 - which assigns the same values as g, except that
 - it assigns b to the variable v.



$[t]_g^{\mathfrak{M}}$ is

- $\mathfrak{M}(t)$ if t is an individual constant, and
- g(t) if t is a variable.

Satisfaction (A. Tarski)

æ

-∢≣⇒

Satisfaction, cont'd

Additionally,

- never $\mathfrak{M} \models \bot[g]$;
- always $\mathfrak{M} \models \top [g]$.

A structure \mathfrak{M} satisfies a sentence P,

 $\mathfrak{M}\models P,$

if $\mathfrak{M} \models P[g_{\emptyset}]$ for the empty assignment g_{\emptyset} .

Example

$$D^{\mathfrak{M}} = \{a, b, c\}$$

$$\mathfrak{M}(\mathit{likes}) = \{ \langle a, a \rangle, \langle a, b \rangle, \langle c, a \rangle \}$$

$$\mathfrak{M} \models \exists x \exists y (Likes(x, y) \land \neg Likes(y, y))$$
$$\mathfrak{M} \models \neg \forall x \exists y (Likes(x, y) \land \neg Likes(y, y))$$

< ≣ >

æ

Satisfaction invariance

Proposition Let \mathfrak{M}_1 and \mathfrak{M}_2 be structures which have the same domain and assign the same interpretations to the predicates and constant symbols in P. Let g_1 and g_2 be variable assignments that assign the same objects to the free variables in P. Then

 $\mathfrak{M}_1 \models P[g_1]$ iff $\mathfrak{M}_2 \models P[g_2]$

First-order validity and consequence

A sentence P is a first-order consequence of a set \mathcal{T} of sentences if and only if every structure that satisfies all the sentences in \mathcal{T} also satisfies P.

A sentence P is a first-order validity if and only if every structure satisfies P.

A set \mathcal{T} of sentences is called first-order satisfiable, if there is a structure satisfies each sentence in \mathcal{T} .

Soundness of \mathcal{F} for FOL

Theorem If $\mathcal{T} \vdash S$, then S is a first-order consequence of \mathcal{T} .

Proof: By induction over the derivation, we show that any sentence occurring in a proof is a first-order consequence of the assumption in force in that step.

An assumption is in force in a step if it is an assumption of the current subproof or an assumption of a higher-level proof.

For rules involving subproofs that work with fresh constants, we need to use satisfaction invariance.

First-order structures

Completeness of the shape axioms

The basic shape axioms

- $\forall x (Tet(x) \lor Dodec(x) \lor Cube(x))$

SameShape introduction and elimination axioms

- $\forall x \forall y ((SameShape(x, y) \land Cube(x)) \rightarrow Cube(y))$
- $\forall x \forall y ((SameShape(x, y) \land Tet(x)) \rightarrow Tet(y))$

Completeness of the shape axioms

Two structures are isomorphic if there is a bijection between their domains that is compatible with extensions of predicate and interpretation of constants.

Assume the language Cube, Tet, Dodec, SameShape

Lemma For any structure satisfying the shape axioms, there is an isomorphic Tarski's world structure.

Theorem Let S be a sentence.

If S is a Tarski's world logical consequence of \mathcal{T} , then

S is a first-order consequence of \mathcal{T} plus the shape axioms.